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ACCESS OF THE AUDIENCE TO THE DISCURSIVE ORDER...
Public sphere and public media
As John Downey points out, the public sphere is partially created by mass media 
institutions and relations.1 The special signifi cance of the latter in the creation 
and functioning of the public sphere is pointed out by Jürgen Habermas. When 
analysing the public sphere power structure, the author distinguishes four types of 
power: political, social, economic and media power.2 According to Habermas, the 
media power is based on a mass communication technology. Those who work in 
politically relevant media sectors (i.e. reporters, journalists, editors, directors, pro-
ducers and publishers) cannot avoid exercising an infl uence because they choose 
and process important political content, and thus intervene in the formation of 
public opinions. The use of media power is manifested in the selection of informa-
tion and its format, the shape and style of programmes as well as results of their 
distribution – in setting goals, or in raising and formulating problems.3 Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the proper functioning of the public sphere depends, to 
a considerable extent, on the existence of a media system that guarantees plural-
ism of opinions and content. As pointed out by Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks, 
the representation of all relevant interests of society ought to be the basic require-
ment that should be met by a democratic media system. After all, the media not 
only teach us about social issues but also affect the degree of importance of the 
presented problems. The authors emphasize that the concept of the public sphere 
of society is currently focused on the extent to which the media can help citizens 
obtain knowledge of the world around them, take a stance on it and decide how 
to act based on reliable information.4 As Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska indicates, 
one of mass media functions in democratic systems is the function of a public de-
bate platform. It is supposed to facilitate the transfer of new opinions, views and 
points of view not only from elites to citizens, but also in the opposite direction. 
This is where different concepts and visions should clash, where the public opin-
ion is shaped and where a consensus, which is one of the most important features 
of democracy, is reached during debate.5 On the other hand, Tomasz Goban-Klas 
indicates that in the contemporary times, the mass media have become, among 
other things, the main means of transmission and source of information necessary 
1 J. Downey, T. Koenig (2006). Is There a European Public Sphere? The Berlusconi-Schulz 
Case. European Journal of Communication, 21(2), p. 168.
2 J. Habermas (2006). Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy 
an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research. Communication 
Theory, 16, p. 419.
3 K. Callaghan, F. Schnell (2005). Farming American Politics. University of Pittsburgh Press, 
Pittsburgh, PA. Za: J. Habermas, op. cit., p. 419.
4 P. Dahlgren, C. Sparks (red.) (2007). Komunikowanie i obywatelskoś ć . Transl. M. Hudak. 
Wydawnictwo Astrum, Wrocław, p. 13, [in:] M. Różycka (2017). Media publiczne a kształtowanie 
przemian społecznych. Naukowy Przegląd Dziennikarski, 1, p. 4.
5 B. Dobek-Ostrowska (2012). Komunikowanie polityczne i publiczne. Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
PWN, Warszawa, p. 183.
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for the functioning of public institutions, as well as a predominant source of im-
ages and defi nitions of social reality, and a source of a public meaning system that 
provides criteria and measures for determining what is normal and what deviates 
from an offi cial and publicly recognized standard of normal behaviour and opin-
ions in both social and normative dimensions. In his opinion, nowadays, the mass 
media are also a public forum (arena) on which issues of political life are present-
ed and considered.6 Teresa Sasińska-Klas also points at the importance of the me-
dia in the process of developing the public sphere. She emphasizes that the media 
are a signifi cant forum for contemporary public discourse.7 They form a platform 
for the shaping and massifi cation of public opinion. It is worth stressing here 
that – as Jürgen Habermas points out – the phrase ‘public opinion’ in singular re-
fers only to an opinion predominant among several public opinions. Such groups 
of synthesized issues and contributions present simultaneously the importance of 
cumulative yes and no attitudes obtained in various groups of audience. Accord-
ing to Jürgen Habermas, public opinions are diffi cult to defi ne; however, he draws 
attention to the fact that they exert a certain political infl uence. The infl uence of 
public opinion spreads in two opposite directions, turning to both the government 
and the audience from which it originally derives. The fact that both elected gov-
ernments and voters may have a positive, negative or indifferent attitude to public 
opinion emphasizes the most important feature of the public sphere, namely its 
refl ective character. All its participants can look again at perceived public opin-
ions and react to them having reconsidered the same.8
However, in order for this process to take place, it is necessary for the audi-
ence to have access to opinions created and presented in the mass media. This 
task is assigned, to a large extent, to a public television broadcaster. The core phi-
losophy of the public media operations, called the concept of a public service or 
social mission of a public broadcaster, consists of eight principles, among which 
– inter alia – actions aimed at the public sphere development are indicated. This 
principle has it that when addressing the audience as citizens, the public media 
should arouse their interest in public affairs, persuade them think in terms of 
social interest as well as strengthen their sense of social identity and nationality. 
Thus, the public media should refl ect the entire variety of thought orientations pre-
sent in public discourse.9 As indicated by Karol Jakubowicz, the properly operating 
public media have always been an important factor in the functioning of democ-
racy. Apart from the task to provide the audience with a certain type of content, 
usually emphasized in a defi nition of these media, the key element of their public 
6 T. Goban-Klas (2011). Media społeczeństwa informacyjnego. W: L.H. Haber (red.). Komuni-
kowanie i zarządzanie w społeczeństwie informacyjnym. Wybrane zagadnienia. Zakład Wydawniczy 
NOMOS, Kraków, p. 53.
7 T. Sasińska-Klas (2014), Mediatyzacja a medializacja sfery publicznej. Zeszyty Prasoznawcze, 
2(218), p. 165.
8 J. Habermas, op. cit., p. 417.
9 M. Mrozowski (2001). Media masowe. Władza, rozrywka i biznes. Ofi cyna Wydawnicza 
ASPRA-JR, Warszawa, p. 230.
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service is the obligation to create the public sphere, form the nationwide audience 
and give events a public nature.10 In the Polish legal order, the legislator has as-
signed the public broadcaster a task of creating programmes that should promote 
the free development of citizens’ views and the forming of public opinions, as 
well as enable the citizens and their organizations to participate in public life 
through presenting diverse views and positions and exercising the right of control 
and social criticism.11 Therefore, the question remains how TVP S.A., as a public 
television broadcaster, has performed this task over the years?
Programming strategies and practices of the Polish Television12
In Poland, system changes that occurred in the fi eld of mass media after 1989 
abolished the existing state’s monopoly in the area of programme creation and 
broadcasting, thus beginning the reforming process of Polish broadcasting com-
munication. The reform was aimed at creating foundations for a democratic, plu-
ralistic and open social communication system. According to these assumptions, 
in a set of future tasks developed then for the public media in Poland, it was 
proposed that they should strive to fully meet the needs of the audience, imple-
ment the principle of freedom of speech, create favourable conditions for political 
and social involvement of citizens and foster the creation of civic society and 
democratization of the governance system as well as stimulate art and culture. To 
this end, the broadcasting system was to be of an open, democratic and pluralistic 
nature, i.e. to provide each signifi cant group and social force with an opportunity 
to propagate their views, on a scale corresponding to their impact, in order to win 
supporters and infl uence the public opinion as well as the authorities.13 Therefore, 
in its shape proposed at that time, TVP was to participate in the creation of the 
public sphere in the democratic system being formed in Poland. In connection 
with the above tasks, the necessity was advocated to make the air available, in 
various forms, for purposes of expressing and defending views, opinions and in-
terests of citizens, parties, organizations as well as professional and local groups. 
This required the development of appropriate journalistic means and forms as 
well as forms of social access to programmes. What turned out to be of importance 
here was the principle of pursuing the so-called active pluralism policy, impos-
10 K. Jakubowicz (2013). Media a demokracja w XXI wieku. Poszukiwanie nowych modeli. 
Wydawnictwo POLTEXT, Warszawa, p. 181.
11 Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 r. o radiofonii i telewizji, Dz.U. 1993 nr 7 poz. 34, art 21, 
ust 2, pkt 3 i 4.
12 The research used in the article was carried out during preparation of the publication: Pro-
gramming of Public Broadcaster in Poland. Essential Determinants of Programming and Distribution 
of Content (Działalność programowa telewizji publicznej. Kluczowe determinanty programowania 
i dystrybucja oferty), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagielloń skiego, Kraków 2017.
13 Główne założenia reformy radiofonii i telewizji. Komisja do Spraw Reformy Radia i Telewizji 
(Commission for the Reform of Radio and Television), Warszawa 1990, p. 4ff.
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ing the obligation on journalists to reach all important forces and social groups, 
to learn about their views and take them into account in programmes. Moreover, 
the broadcasters’ responsibilities were complemented with such tasks as partici-
pation in the transformation of the country’s economic system, popularization of 
knowledge of market economy mechanisms, popularisation of knowledge on the 
government’s activities and objectives it pursues – providing a comprehensive 
explanation and analysis of the government’s programme, as well as educational 
activities, performing the culture-forming role and providing cultural patronage.14 
However, the proposed – undoubtedly progressive – solutions as regards the pub-
lic broadcaster’s participation in the creation of the public sphere were not applied 
in practice. What is more, until the late 1990s, no strategy was implemented in 
TVP S.A. that would provide an answer to the question: how should the public 
broadcaster participate, if at all, in the shaping of the public sphere in Poland?
The variability of the context in which the public broadcaster had to operate in 
Poland in the destabilized state and political system of the 1990s and the lack of 
internal decisions within TVP S.A. itself caused that the regulator of the electronic 
market in Poland, the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), noticed the need 
to achieve this goal and proposed to assign additional tasks to the public broad-
caster.15 First of all, the National Broadcasting Council indicated the need for the 
participation of TVP S.A. in the process of building the public sphere in Poland. 
This was to be achieved by explaining in programmes of TVP S.A. the principles 
of a new political, state and economic order as well as cooperation with state 
institutions and representatives of the society, while maintaining its own impar-
tiality and autonomy, in order to gain access to information and to enable them to 
present their activities and positions directly to the public. Furthermore, TVP S.A. 
was supposed to satisfy information and communication needs and rights of the 
society as an element of building democracy and civil society. In order to make it 
possible to meet these demands, the National Broadcasting Council imposed du-
ties that were to relate to several areas on TVP S.A.
Firstly, the period of the accelerated systemic change in Poland of that time 
also resulted in the society’s intensive demand for information, analyses, explana-
tions and interpretations of the processes taking place. This state of affairs caused 
that the National Broadcasting Council saw the need to give an important mean-
ing to the informational and educational function of television. This was to mani-
fest itself in the adoption by TVP S.A. of a conscious and thoughtful strategy for 
imbuing the entire programming and various genres with content that would al-
low the audience to learn about and understand the processes taking place, fi nd 
their direction and sense, understand what they meant to an individual and the lat-
ter’s social environment and what opportunities they created for and what threats 
14 Ibidem, p. 4.
15 Przyszłość Telewizji Publicznej w Polsce. Tezy do dyskusji. Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Tele-
wizji (Commission for the Reform of Radio and Television), Warszawa 1995, p. 10ff.
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they posed to that individual. This task was to be one of the basic objectives of the 
programming activities, implemented by a multitude of forms and genres. There-
fore, the public broadcaster’s programming was to be saturated with the news, 
documentaries, commentaries, educational programmes about nature and fi lms.
Secondly, the situation of the accelerated change gave rise to particularly lively 
political and social activities of various social groups, e.g. in the form of the need 
to articulate their views and interests in the public forum. According to the Na-
tional Broadcasting Council, the public television was to meet this need.
Thirdly, the programming of the TVP S.A. should leave space for various 
groups of Polish society to present their views and hold discussions. Therefore, 
the programming could not have served to deepen differences of opinions, to 
exacerbate confl icts that divide the society, to promote any orientation or to con-
demn any set of views falling within the limits of human rights.16
Changes taking place on the media market at the beginning of the 21st century 
posed even greater challenges to TVP S.A. in terms of its infl uence on the public 
sphere. The development of paid analogue and digital television, a change in the 
manner of watching TV, fragmentation of the audience and the process of erosion 
of viewers’ loyalty towards television stations are only some of the challenges 
that the public broadcaster had to face in the new media reality. To counteract the 
above-mentioned phenomena, it was postulated in TVP S.A. to adopt a strategy 
assuming a change in the philosophy of the programming policy of that time. 
The core of the planned change was the assumption that when competing for 
the audience, TVP had to make such programming changes that would provide 
it with a satisfactory level of audience, especially during prime time. The solu-
tion was not to consist in adopting the same strategies as applied by commercial 
broadcasters, but to refer to the idea of public service. These decisions were to 
prove fraught with consequences in the future, also in terms of the participation 
of TVP S.A. in the process of generating public opinion. As a result of the actions 
taken, the following years meant that TVP S.A. would abandon in its strategic 
decisions the idea of creation of a programming offer that takes into account the 
task of shaping the public sphere.
However, it should be pointed out that despite the lack of assumptions of a strate-
gic nature, some attempts were made to perform at least part of this task in TVP1 by 
offering programming that aspired to be opinion-forming or a forum for exchange 
of views. The program strategy adopted in 200417 defi ned rules for the construc-
tion of TVP1 programming, based on news services that were to set the rhythm of 
the day. There was indicated the need to create new programme forms and genres, 
as well as the necessity to apply the principle of differentiation of the audience and 
adjustment of programme forms to the latter. In addition, it was assumed that dur-
16 Ibidem.
17 Strategia programowa Telewizji Polskiej do 2004 roku. Telewizja Polska S.A., Warszawa 
2001.
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ing prime time, i.e. from 7.00 pm to 10.30 pm, attractive programmes, such as 
live debates, current documentaries or Polish movies, would be broadcast. Such 
a repertoire was supposed to distinguish TVP from the offer of commercial broad-
casters. Despite the fact that the core of the offer was to consist of fi lms, series and 
soap operas, it was planned that commentaries were to be the second predominant 
genre in TVP1. Their share was assumed at the level of 15%. The programmes 
were to focus on social, economic and commentary issues, and a live show was to 
become a preferred form that was to enable the participation of viewers by phone 
and through the Internet. The share of feature programmes and documentaries 
was assumed to be at the level of 10%. It was planned to increase the amount of 
news reports, which were to constitute 8.6% of the programming offer. It was as-
sumed to create a chain of longer and shorter news reports with a content-related 
specialization of individual editions adapted to time slots, recipients and the sub-
ject matter. The news was to be broadcast either as an independent programme or
within clearly separated segments containing commentaries on current events
or ongoing processes.18
In the Company Development Strategy for 2002–200619 the previously adopt-
ed solutions regarding the programming policy did not change. Only the share 
of commentaries was increased to 17%. The subsequent years did not bring any 
signifi cant changes in the programming policy of TVP.
Activities of TVP S.A. (or rather the lack thereof) as regards the public broad-
caster’s participation in the development of the public sphere seem to be the more 
surprising because participation of the media in this area was one of the tasks 
included in the “Strategy of the Polish State in the fi eld of electronic media.”20 
It follows from that document that the fulfi lment of democratic functions of the 
electronic media (i.e. facilitation of free formation of citizens’ views and public 
opinion, providing citizens and their organizations with an opportunity to partici-
pate in public life and exercising the right to control and social criticism) requires 
the presence of specifi c genres (the news, commentaries, documentaries) in the 
programming offer. While other citizens can use various sources of information 
and forms of participation in the public debate on issues relating to life in their 
area, residents of smaller towns and rural areas may be deprived of it, especially 
in view of the press concentration and transformations in the local press belonging 
to large press corporations. Therefore, it is important to protect the informative 
and commentary functions in local radio and television stations.21 While the said 
postulate was addressed to local broadcasters, the public broadcaster’s participa-
18 Ibidem.
19 Strategia rozwoju Spółki Telewizja Polska S.A. 2002–2006, Projekt. Telewizja Polska S.A., 
Warszawa 2002, p. 11ff.
20 Strategia państwa polskiego w dziedzinie mediów elektronicznych na lata 2005–2020. Kra-
jowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (Commission for the Reform of Radio and Television), Warszawa 
2005.
21 Ibidem, p. 32.
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tion in these activities seems obvious. Unfortunately, neither was the situation of 
TVP S.A. improved by a document setting out rules for the public service mission 
of TVP, developed by TVP S.A. in 2005. It included provisions directly defi ning 
responsibilities of TVP S.A. in the area of shaping the public sphere in Poland. As 
it follows from that document, “considering the special role of television in the 
process of individual and public opinion-shaping, TVP strives to present phenom-
ena, positions and views in their many aspects; TVP avoids sensationism, glaring 
simplifi cations and creation of an unjustifi ed sense of threat; it shows facts and 
phenomena in a broad context.”22
A change in the perception of the role of TVP in the process of shaping the 
public sphere did not occur until the second decade of the 21st century. Then
the issue of involvement of TVP S.A. in the shaping of the public sphere became 
one of factors determining standards of commentary programmes. As if follows 
from the Management Board’s Report for 2011, “commentary programmes are 
aimed at presenting and thoroughly explaining problems and phenomena, taking 
into account different aspects, arguments and points of view. These programmes 
serve as a public forum where activities of the government, political parties, em-
ployees ‘and employers’ organizations and other public and social life entities are 
presented. They often take the form of a debate in which viewers participate, and 
their live broadcast gives their viewers a sense of participation in the discussion.23
Continuing the process of involvement of TVP S.A. in the shaping of the pub-
lic sphere, it was indicated in assumptions to the Strategy of TVP for 2012–2015 
that the objective of TVP’s operations was to rebuild the role of the public broad-
caster as the main opinion-forming medium and to hold a dialogue with viewers 
and public domain circles. These activities were to result in signifi cant engage-
ment of TVP in building the social capital. To this end, it was proposed to under-
take activities in the programming and functional areas, consisting in:
• triggering debates on the most important civilization issues;
• inspiring and conducting social campaigns;
• supporting the fi ght against negative social phenomena, such as social ex-
clusion;
• making the air and the Internet website available for debates on issues most 
important to Poland;
• interactive forms of television broadcast (an element supporting the debate 
and building a civil society);
22 Zasady realizowania przez Telewizję Polską S.A. misji publicznej. Załącznik do Uchwały 
Zarządu TVP S.A. (Annex to the resolution of the Board TVP S.A.) No. 108/2005 of March 29, 2005. 
Telewizja Polska S.A., Warszawa 2005, pkt 23.
23 Sprawozdanie Zarządu z wykorzystania przez Telewizję Polską S.A. wpływów z opłat abona-
mentowych na realizację misji publicznej w 2011 roku, Załącznik do Uchwały Zarządu Spółki TVP 
S.A. (Annex to the resolution of the Board TVP S.A.) No. 144/2012 of March 14, 2012. Telewizja 
Polska S.A., Warszawa 2012, p. 24.
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• strengthening the news and commentary offer and supporting integration 
of communities and environments in regional programs and on regional 
websites of TVP;
• dialogue with viewers;
• introduction of a system for winning the public opinion and opinion-form-
ing circles (using the Internet to communicate with viewers, establishing 
a Team for Contacts with Viewers and appointing a Spokesperson of View-
ers);
• presence on opinion forums, in social networks, building its own commu-
nity and development of civic journalism.24
Moreover, the discussed strategy maintained the previous defi nition of TVP1 
as a nationwide and universal channel addressed at a wide audience. Originally, 
TVP1 was to increase the share of demanding, open-minded and ambitious view-
ers. In terms of its profi le, it was to remain the most universal television channel 
building civic aspirations and encouraging involvement in public affairs. As re-
gards preferred programme genres, TVP1 was to exhibit the news, commentar-
ies, documentaries, feature fi lms and series of the Polish and foreign market, as 
well as broadcasts of prestigious (sports, cultural and public) events. Its objective 
was to build civic aspirations among viewers and engage them in public affairs, 
develop and educate Polish society, including in the fi eld of law and economics. 
TVP1 was also supposed to provide an explanation of the state policy, and also 
meet the needs of the youngest audience.25 The following years brought continua-
tion of activities in the area of shaping the public sphere by TVP S.A. at the level 
of strategic plans. In the “Company Strategy for 2016–2020”26 it was planned to 
return to the assumptions from before 2002 and end the harmful programming 
competition with commercial broadcasters. Actions were planned to help TVP to 
follow the processes occurring on the media market, including to promote civic 
education, and its fundamental role was to explain the reality. Specifi c goals in the 
programming area assumed, among other things, activities in the fi eld of public 
debate. They were to engage the public broadcaster in the public debate through 
involvement of leading news programmes in the process. Furthermore, TVP S.A. 
was to introduce the exclusivity of its own production in the area of news and 
commentary programmes. Moreover, the public broadcaster was to create its own 
formats for civic and economic education as well as journalism. Activities in the 
area of public debate were also to include the reconstruction of programmes of 
regional televisions, creation of formats for news programmes, commentaries and 
24 Strategia TVP na lata 2012–2015. Funkcjonalna strategia programowa. Telewizja Polska S.A., 
Warszawa 2012, p. 2.
25 Based on: Analiza strategiczna TVP; Funkcjonalna Strategia Programowa. Strategia TVP S.A. 
na lata 2012–2015; Strategia Zarządu Spółki Telewizja Polska S.A. [in:] Strategia TVP S.A. na lata 
2012–2015. Telewizja Polska S.A., Warszawa 2012.
26 Strategia Spółki TVP S.A. 2016–2020. Telewizja Polska S.A., Warszawa 2015. Based on ma-
terials provided by TVP S.A.
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documentaries, as well as diversifi cation of sources of programmes obtained from 
external producers.27 TVP1 was still to remain the most universal TV channel 
in the public broadcaster’s offer. It was to be engaged in public affairs, and its 
main task was to build civic aspirations. The programming assumed exhibiting 
news programmes, commentaries, documentaries, feature fi lms produced on Pol-
ish and foreign markets as well as broadcasting prestigious sports events. The 
channel was also to support education of society and create a forum for discussion 
on the most important social, political and economic issues. The main program-
ming tasks focused on strengthening the position of news reports and commentar-
ies, ensuring broadcasts of the most important state and church celebrations, as 
well as creating a platform for journalistic debates relating to events at home and 
abroad. TVP1 was to maintain the current strategy of offer serialization, which 
translated into continuation of the existing time slots.28
When analysing the issue of participation of the public broadcaster in shaping 
the public sphere, it is impossible to pass over the impact of technological chang-
es on distribution of the TVP programming offer, and thus its availability to the 
potential audience. The development of parallel or alternative content distribution 
platforms based, to a large extent, on access to the Internet, causes that a lack 
of skills or possibility to use them can become a reason for the so-called digi-
tal exclusion. As indicated by Władysława Jastrzębska and Anna Jastrzębska, the 
process of constructing the Internet network infrastructure does not occur evenly 
in all countries. This has resulted in uneven pace of spreading the new technol-
ogy, which has contributed to the so-called digital exclusion, or digital divide. 
According to the OECD defi nition, this is a phenomenon of social inequality, or 
even a gap among individuals, households, enterprises and regions at the level of 
social and economic development relating to the access to and use of informa-
tion and communication technologies in all spheres of economic activity.29 As it 
follows from the “National Development Strategy 2020”30 in Poland, the axes of 
division between people profi cient in digital technologies and those who do not 
have such skills include age, place of residence and level of education. While the 
use of the Internet is quite common among young people, digital exclusion of 
older people is becoming a signifi cant problem. It should be emphasized here that 
in the case of the second group, digital competencies have not constituted a natu-
ral component of the socialization processes and are strongly correlated with the 
level of education.31 As a result, the basic problem in reducing the phenomenon 
of digital divide and the barrier to the widespread use of new information and 
27 Ibidem, p. 7.
28 Based on materials provided by TVP S.A.
29 A. Jastrzębska, W. Jastrzębska. Wykluczenie cyfrowe – przyczyny, zagrożenia i bariery jego 
pokonania. Studium przypadku, p. 92 [www.ur.edu.pl/fi le/20797/09.pdf; 26.03.2015].
30 Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 2020. Ministerstwo Rozwoju Gospodarczego, Warszawa 2012, 
s. 115. Dokument przyjęty uchwałą Rady Ministrów of September 25, 2012.
31 Ibidem.
ACCESS OF THE AUDIENCE TO THE DISCURSIVE ORDER...
76 WERONIKA ŚWIERCZYŃSKA-GŁOWNIA
K
R
A
JO
W
A
 
SF
ER
A
 
PU
B
LI
C
ZN
A
communication technologies is not a lack of access to computers and the Inter-
net, but motivation, knowledge and skills to use them.32 According to data of the 
Central Statistical Offi ce, 77.9 per cent of households had at least one computer 
at home in 2015 whereas 75.8 per cent of households had access to the network.33 
However, in the area of digital exclusion, there are still older and less educated 
people. These two factors: age and education primarily determine the accessibility 
of the Internet, and it is not only about elementary digital competences that allow 
one to enter the network itself, but also about the skills to navigate it, search for 
content, use services and functions.34 Therefore, it should be assumed that tradi-
tional television is becoming, to a large extent, the only platform that enables the 
elderly and less-educated people to participate in shaping the public opinion and 
in the public sphere. Taking into consideration the above observations, attention 
should be given to the policy applied by TVP over the years in the area of profi l-
ing the audience. While the legislator has placed the public broadcaster under the 
obligation to provide a programming offer to the whole society and its individual 
parts, the policy adopted by TVP over the years seems to deny the idea of a public 
broadcaster. TVP S.A. entered the 21st century mainly with a mature viewer, who 
grew up with traditional television and for whom television was the main source 
of information about the world, a place for shaping views and opinions. However, 
this viewer was not attractive from the commercial point of view. As a result, 
TVP S.A. launched activities aimed at “rejuvenation” of the audience and getting 
closer to a commercial group of viewers.
Thus, although in 2000, TVP1 was still dominated by viewers over 55 years 
of age, in 2003, it was planned that the audience of TVP1 would mainly con-
sist of people of the age group of 40 years and more. In terms of the structure of 
education and professional groups, in 2000, the viewers of TVP1 were mainly 
people with secondary and higher education and people in managerial positions, 
practising prestigious professions. Moreover, viewers of TVP1 were also unem-
ployed and retired people as well as housewives. Such a signifi cant dissonance 
within the main group of viewers resulted in 2000 with divergent expectations 
and needs that the programming offer was to satisfy. In 2003, the programming 
was to be addressed to people with vocational and secondary education and, at 
the same time, to active people and those with higher professional aspirations.
In the case of TVP2, in 2000, its audience mainly consisted of viewers aged 
46 and more, with higher than vocational education. These were people living in 
small towns of up to 100,000 residents, the unemployed, the retired and house-
32 Strategia Rozwoju Kapitału Społecznego 2020. Załącznik do uchwały Rady Ministrów 
(Annex to the Resolution of the Council of Ministers) No. 61 of March 26, 2013 (poz. 378) w sprawie 
przyjęcia Strategii Rozwoju Kapitału Społecznego 2020, s. 18ff.
33 GUS: ponad 75 procent Polaków ma dostęp do Internetu. PAP 20.10.2015, https://www.pol-
skieradio.pl/42/273/Artykul/1533636,GUS-ponad-75-procent-Polakow-ma-dostep-do-Internetu; 
21.08.2017.
34 Ibidem.
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wives. Similarly to TVP1, it was also planned in respect of TVP2 to rejuvenate 
the audience over a period of three years. It was assumed that in 2003, the viewers 
of TVP2 would be people over 35 years of age. It was also planned to change the 
structure of the audience and address the programming to professionally active 
people who live in large cities. As in the case of TVP1, it was also assumed to ad-
dress part of the offer to children and young people.35 In addition, in 2001, TVP 
S.A. adopted a document titled: “Programming strategy of the Polish Tele vision 
until 2004.”36 As regards the audience profi le of the main channels, it was assumed 
then that TVP1 would expand its audience by children of up to 9 years of age and 
people aged 16 to 49, as well as residents of villages and small towns. Therefore, 
it was the moment when the public broadcaster offi cially began to shape the pro-
gramming offer taking into account the commercial target group. In the case of 
TVP2, the audience was to be expanded to include young people from 9 to 15 years 
of age and people aged 35 to 45. It was also planned for the programming offer 
to reach viewers with higher education, higher income and living in large cities. 
Thus, TVP2 remained, in the assumptions, outside the commercial group. It was 
supposed to address its offer to children and young people of up to 15 years of age, 
and then the programming was to be dedicated to viewers over 35 years of age.37 
The adopted policy eventually resulted in the fact that in 2006, in TVP S.A., the 
programme evaluation system considered audience fi gures only in the so-called 
commercial group, i.e. aged 16 to 49, treating viewers over 50 as, de facto, second-
class viewers. Therefore, the programming offer was adjusted to the needs of the 
commercial group while ambitious programmes were marginalized at the same 
time. In this way, TVP gave up trying to create its own audience.38
However, the practice showed that the actions taken by the broadcaster aimed 
at rejuvenating the audience not only proved ineffective, but also resulted in the 
outfl ow of loyal viewers. In 2012, in terms of age, TVP1 and TVP2 were still 
channels with an older audience with overrepresentation of the audience over
45 years of age. In terms of the place of residence, TVP1 was more often chosen 
by people living in the countryside or in smaller towns than people living in cities. 
In the case of TVP2, the situation was very similar to that of TVP1. In terms of 
education, TVP1 was a station most often selected by people with basic educa-
tion, and there was a decrease in viewers with secondary and higher education. 
TVP2 was also chosen mainly by people with basic education and, similarly to 
TVP1, with a deteriorating profi le of viewers with secondary education.39
35 Based on: Strategia programowa TVP S.A. Telewizja Polska S.A., Warszawa 2000, p. 9ff.
36 Strategia programowa Telewizji Polskiej do 2004 roku. Telewizja Polaka S.A., Warszawa 
2001, p. 16.
37 Ibidem.
38 More about: W. Świerczyńska-Głownia (2017). Działalność programowa telewizji publicznej. 
Kluczowe determinanty programowania i dystrybucja oferty. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagielloń-
skiego, Kraków, p. 215ff.
39 Strategia TVP SA na lata 2012–2015. Analiza strategiczna. Telewizja Polska S.A., Warszawa 
2012, p. 30ff.
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Conclusions
As the practice showed, the audience profi le of the public broadcaster at the be-
ginning of the second decade of the 21st century remained similar to that from the 
late 1990s. It is also a mature viewer, for whom traditional television has always 
been the medium of fi rst choice and a place for seeking information and shaping 
opinions. Showing concern for this viewer, as well as enabling them to participate 
in the public sphere, seems to be one of the main tasks currently faced by TVP 
S.A. As it follows from internal analyses of the public broadcaster, these are the 
viewers who will remain its loyal audience. As a result, the audience of TVP S.A. 
will continue to grow old.40
It also remains signifi cant that, despite efforts, the programming offer of TVP 
S.A. has not attracted younger viewers,41 and the public broadcaster has not man-
aged to come into existence effectively in the new media. Although the Polish 
Television started activities in the area of providing content with the use of vari-
ous tools as early as in 1989, in the following years the public broadcaster has 
failed to develop a long-term strategy in this area. First of all, TVP S.A. has not 
created its own distribution platform for multi-platform broadcasting. As a result, 
the digital offer of the public television has been available through a dozen or 
so large Internet websites and several hundred services with different coverage. 
This state of affairs has prevented TVP S.A. from creation of a single, identifi able 
platform for presenting positions and opinions. The weakness of TVP S.A. has 
also been a lack of identical offer in all distribution channels, which caused that it 
was impossible for the user to become familiar with the full offer on any chosen 
device. As a result, the public broadcaster has been virtually eliminated from the 
social discourse taking place in the area of the new media.42
Taking into consideration all the above remarks, it can be pointed out that 
over the years TVP S.A. has failed to use the opportunity to create a platform for 
discussion, exchange of thoughts and shaping of the public opinion. The program 
strategies adopted by the broadcaster as well as the actions taken have resulted 
in the elimination of TVP S.A. from the process of shaping the public sphere. 
A change that has occurred in recent years in the approach to this issue on a stra-
tegic level allows one to assume that in the future, TVP S.A. will become an ac-
tive participant in public discourse. Whether or not this will be the case will be 
determined by the manner and form adopted by the public broadcaster to pursue 
the assumed goals.
40 Ibidem.
41 Ibidem.
42 More about: W. Świerczyńska-Głownia, op. cit., p. 250ff.
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